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VALUE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR-
SELF-INTERESTED: MORALISTIC:: ALTRUISTIC: MORAL
JONATHAN BARON'
I distinguish four types of goals: self-interested, altruistic, moralistic, and
moral. Moralistic goals are those that people attempt to impose on others, regard-
less of the others' true interests. These may become prominent in political behavior
such as voting because such behavior has relatively little effect on self-interested
goals. I argue (sometimes with experimental evidence) that common decisional bi-
ases concerned with allocation, protected values, and parochialism often take the
form of moralistic values. Because moralistic values are often bundled together
with other values that are based on false beliefs, they can be reduced through vari-
ous kinds of reflection or "de-biasing."
If your morals make you dreary, depend upon it they are wrong. I do
not say "give them up," for they may be all you have; but conceal them
like a vice .... '
INTRODUCTION
The quality of government is a major determinant of the quality of
people's lives. Underdeveloped countries suffer from misguided eco-
nomic policies, such as price controls and subsidies, overinvestment in
arms and underinvestment in health and education, excessive regula-
tion, and corruption. Developed countries also suffer from unbal-
anced national budgets, inefficient subsidies, and other ills, but the
developed countries generally have better government. World prob-
lems, such as depletion of fisheries, suffer from a lack of regulation
and international institutions!
t Useful comments were provided by Matthew Adler, Steven Shavell, students in a
class at Harvard Law School, participants in the University of Pennsylvania Decision
Processes Brown Bag, and attendees of the University of Pennsylvania Law School
Symposium on Preferences and Rational Choice. The experiments were supported by
grants from the National Science Foundation and the Russell Sage Foundation.
I ROBERT LouIs STEVENSON, A CHRISTMAS SERMON 19 (1906).
2 See JONATHAN BARON,JUDGMENT MISGUIDED: INTUITION AND ERROR IN PUBLIC
DECISION MAKING 1-20 (1998) (arguing that government decision making is flawed
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In the long run, and sometimes in the short run, government pol-
icy depends on the political actions and omissions of citizens. But the
individual citizen typically has little influence. Thus, one of the most
important determinants of our well-being is controlled almost com-
pletely by our collective behavior but is affected very little'by our indi-
vidual behavior. This situation contrasts with that in a free market for
goods and services, where our well-being is also affected by our deci-
sions, but individual decisions have a direct effect on individual out-
comes. In political behavior-such as voting, responding to polls, try-
ing to influence others, writing letters, or making contributions of
time and money-our little actions are pooled together to make one
huge decision that affects us all.
This situation opens up the possibility that political behavior is less
sensitive to its consequences for the decision maker, and more sensi-
tive to other factors such as emotions and, I shall argue, moral (or
moralistic) principles.' Political behavior might therefore be more
subject to decisional biases, fallacies, and errors than is market-
oriented behavior." This insensitivity to consequences, if it happens, is
interesting for the study of rational decision making. It raises special
questions, and I want to address some of these issues. First, I describe
a distinction among types of values, which is the main point of this Ar-
ticle. Next, I summarize some experimental evidence about how peo-
ple think about their values.
I assume utilitarianism as a normative theory, as a standard against
which I compare people's judgments and decisions. This theory is de-
and advocating for improvement in the way decisions are made), available at
http://www.sas.upenn.edu/-baron/vbook.htm; MAX H. BAZERMAN ET AL., YOU CAN'T
ENLARGE THE PIE: Six BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT, at xvi-xx (2001) (present-
ing six ways in which government decision making causes societal harm).
3 For discussions of the idea that political behavior is "expressive," see GEOFFREY
BRENNAN & ALAN HAMLIN, DEMOCRATIC DEVICES AND DESIRES 30-33 (2000); GEOFFREY
BRENNAN & LOREN LOMASKY, DEMOCRACY AND DECISION: THE PURE THEORY OF
ELECIORAL PREFERENCE 35-38 (1993).
See Colin F. Camerer, Do Biases in Probability Judgment Matter in Markets? Experi-
mental Evidence, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 981, 981-97 (1987) (giving an example of how mar-
ket discipline can reduce biases in repeated situations). But cf Jane Beattie & Graham
Loomes, The inpact of Incentives upon Risky Choice Experiments, 14J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
155, 165-66 (1997) (testing the hypothesis that financial incentives are "not a crucial
factor in encouraging" particular choices in pairwise choice problems, and concluding
that there may be situations in which incentives affect the decision-making process);
Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments:
A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 7-42
(1999) (analyzing experimental data and concluding that incentives often do not im-
prove performance).
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fended elsewhere . Utilitarianism enjoins us to make decisions that
produce the best consequences on the whole, for everyone, balancing
the gains and losses. If we fall short of this standard, then we make
decisions that make someone worse off-relative to the standard-
without making anyone better off to an extent sufficient to balance
the harm. Utilitarianism, then, has at least this advantage: if we want
to know why decisions sometimes yield consequences that are less
good than they could be on the whole, one possible answer is that
people are making decisions according to principles that are
systematically nonutilitarian, and they are getting results that follow
their principles rather than results that yield the best outcome.
6
A. Types of Goals
Decisions are designed to achieve goals, or (in other words) objec-
tives or values. Goals may be understood as criteria for the evaluation
of decisions or their outcomes.7 I use the term "goals" very broadly to
include (in some senses) everything a person values. Behavior is ra-
tional to the extent to which it achieves goals. Rational political be-
havior will not happen without goals.
Goals, in the sense I describe, are criteria for evaluating states of
affairs. They are reflectively endorsed. They are the result of thought
and are, in this sense, "constructed" in much the way that concepts are
the result of reflection. Goals are not simply desires, and very young
children might properly be said to have no goals at all, in the sense at
See JONATHAN BARON, MORALITY AND RATIONAL CHOICE (1993) [hereinafter
BARON, MORALITY] (countering arguments that utilitarianism cannot explain people's
decisions);JOHN BROOME, WEIGH ING GOODS: EQUALFITY, UNCERTAINTY AND TIME 1-21
(1991) (defending multiple assertions about the structure of "good," including utili-
tarianism); RICHARD M. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD AND POINT 1-
24 (1981) (arguing for a form of utilitarianism); Jonathan Baron, Nonn-Endorsement
Utilitarianism and the Nature of Utility, 12 ECON. & PHIL. 165, 165-82 (1996) [hereinafter
Baron, Norm-Endorsement] (rejecting moral intuition and arguing that utilitarianism
justifies moral claims); cf LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS
WELFARE 11 (2002) (arguing that an assessment of individuals' well-being is essential
to policy analysis).
6 Aiming directly at utilitarian outcomes is not always the best way to reach the
most beneficial outcomes. See HARE, supra note 5, at 48-49 (asserting that even though
the best outcomes are not always achieved, the principles underlying utilitarianism still
hold true). Sometimes it may be better to follow simple rules, such as, "Don't kill non-
combatants," even when violating the rules appears to be for the best. For the cases I
discuss, however, it may be sufficient to be aware of such situations so that we know-
ingly follow rules because we believe they lead to the best outcomes.
I Baron, Norm-Endorsement, supra note 5, at 166.
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issue. Your goals fall into four categories: self-interested, altruistic,
moralistic, and moral. These correspond to a two-by-two classification.
One dimension of this classification is whether or not your goals de-
pend on the goals of others. The other dimension is whether they
concern others' voluntary behavior.
For Your Behavior For Others' Behavior
Dependent on Others' Altruistic Moral
Goals
Independent of Others' Self-Interested Moralistic
Goals
The idea of dependence on others' goals assumes that goals are
associated with the individuals who have them. Your goals are contin-
gent on your existence. If you were never born, no goals would be
yours. Your self-interested goals are those that are yours, in this
sense. Altruistic (and moral) goals are goals for the achievement of
others' goals. Your altruistic goals concerning another person are
thus a replica in you of the other person's goals. Altruism may be lim-
ited to certain people or certain types of goals. But it rises or falls as
the goals of others rise and fall)
We have goals for what other people do voluntarily. The behavior
of others is a kind of consequence, which has utility for us. But this
type of consequence has a special place in discussion of social issues.
It is these goals for others' behavior thatjustify laws, social norms, and
morality itself. When you have goals for the behavior of others, you
apply criteria to their behavior rather than to your own. But of course
these are still your own goals, so you try to do things that affect the
behavior of others. ° When we endorse behavior for others, we want
them to want to choose it.
8 1 do not assume that goals cease with death. Indeed, I have argued that they may
continue. See id. at 177-79 (arguing that we should honor people's wishes even after
they are dead).
9 We could imagine negative altruism, in which Xwants Y's goals to be frustrated
in proportion to their strength. Clearly such goals exist and influence political behav-
ior, but I do not discuss them here.
10 "Behavior" includes their goals, and all their thinking, as well as their overt be-
havior (just as self-interested goals may concern your own mental states), and excludes
involuntary or coerced behavior.
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What I call "moral goals" are goals concerning the behavior of
others so as to achieve their goals as well as your own. These are
"moral" in the utilitarian sense only. In fact, they are the fundamental
goals thatjustify the advocacy of utilitarianism." I shall return to these
goals.
By contrast, moralistic goals are goals for the behavior of others
that are independent of the others' goals. People could want others
(and themselves) not to engage in homosexual behavior, or not to de-
sire it.12 Other examples abound in public discourse, including: an-
tipathy to drug use; enforcement of particular religions against other
religions; and promotion of certain tastes in fashion, personal appear-
ance, or artistic style against other tastes."
Often the public discourse about such things is expressed in the
language of consequences. Moralistic goals usually come bundled
with beliefs that they correspond to better consequences (a phe-
nomenon that has been called "belief overkill") . For example, op-
ponents of homosexuality claim that the behavior associated with it
increases mental disorders, and this argument, if true, is relevant to
those who do not find homosexuality inherently repugnant.
The people whose behavior is the concern of moralistic goals
could be limited to some group. Your goals for others' behavior could
be limited to others who share your religion or nationality, for exam-
ple. In a sense, altruism can be limited, but truly moral goals cannot.
You can have altruistic goals toward only certain other people, not car-
ing about the rest. But if you have goals for others' behavior based
only on these altruistic goals, these goals are actually moralistic, not
altruistic, because they are independent of the goals of those outside
11 See Baron, Norm-Endorsement, supra note 5, at 173-82 (providing examples of the
kinds of fundamental goals that serve people's self-interests).
12 It is a moralistic goal if we want people who have homosexual desires to over-
ride them through conscious effort. But it is not a moralistic goal if we simply want to
prevent homosexual behavior through coercion, e.g., through round-the-clock super-
vision of boys in a boarding school. The point is that the overriding is voluntary, even
though the desire is still present.
Clearly the goals of fanatics who carry out terrorist attacks, and their supporters,
are at least partly moralistic. Terrorists do not engage in ordinary political behavior, to
be sure, but many of their financial supporters do.
14 See BARON, supra note 2, at 13-14 (defining this effect as the distortion of the
rational arguments for and against controversial issues through "wishful thinking" that
ignores strong arguments contrary to the agent's beliefs); ROBERTJERVIS, PERCEPTION
AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 129-36 (1976) (providing some his-
torical examples in which policymakers adjusted their beliefs to agree with policies al-
ready chosen).
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of your sphere of altruism. This is just a consequence of the way I
have defined "moralistic." We might want to distinguish moralistic
goals that come from limited altruism from those that come from self-
interest alone (which I shall discuss shortly).
In sum, unlike moral goals, moralistic goals can go against the
goals of others. When moralistic goals play out in politics, they can
interfere with people's achievement of their own goals. That is, if we
define "utility" as a measure of goal achievement, moralistic goals de-
crease the utility of other goals. They need not do this if enough
people have the same goals for themselves as others have for them.
But the danger is there, especially on the world scale or in local socie-
ties with greater diversity of goals.
Moral goals may also involve going against the goals of some in
order to achieve the goals of others. But moral goals are those that
make this trade-off without bringing in any additional goals of the de-
cision maker about the behavior of others.
Altruism and moralism are difficult to distinguish because of the
possibility of paternalistic altruism. A true altruist may still act against
your stated preferences, because these preferences may depend on
false beliefs and thus may be unrelated to your true underlying goals.
Undoubtedly, moralists often believe that they are altruists in just this
way. The experiments I review later," however, will suggest that some
moralism does not take this form. People think that their values
should sometimes be imposed on others even when they (ostensibly)
agree that the consequences are worse and that the others involved do
not agree with the values being imposed. Moreover, even when peo-
ple think that they are being paternalistically altruistic, they may be
wrong. Although underlying goals are difficult to discover and some-
what labile, their existence is often a matter of fact.
Because other people's moralistic goals-in contrast to their altru-
istic and moral goals-are independent of our own individual goals,
each of us has reason to want to replace moralistic goals with altruistic
goals. Specifically, you will benefit from the altruistic and moral goals
of others, and you will also benefit from their moralistic goals, if these
agree with your own goals. But you will suffer from moralistic goals
that conflict with your goals.
15 See Baron, Norm-Endorsement, supra note 5, at 174-75 (discussing the relationship
between individuals' erroneous goals and paternalistic policies).
I Infra Part Il1.
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It is conceivable that most moralistic goals have greater benefits
than costs, relative to their absence, and that they could not be re-
placed with other goals-such as moral goals-that have even greater
benefits. But it is also conceivable that moralistic goals arise from the
same underlying motivation that yields moral goals and that the dif-
ference is a matter of belief, which depends on culture, including
child rearing and education. Some of the beliefs in question may be
false and subject to correction. To the extent that moralistic goals can
be replaced with more beneficial moral goals, we have reason to try to
make this happen. More generally, if we had only altruistic and self-
interested goals, and only true beliefs, we might have no reason to
adopt any moralistic goals at all. Moralistic goals serve neither self-
interest nor altruism.
B. A Norm-Endorsement Argument
"Norm endorsement" is what I call the activity we undertake to try
to influence the behavior of others. I have argued that norm en-
dorsement is a fundamental moral activity in terms of which morality
can be defined. 7 By this view, what should count as moral is what we
each have reason to endorse for others and ourselves to follow, assum-
ing that we have put aside our current moral views. By this account,
moralistic goals are nonmoral. But we all have reason to endorse
moral and altruistic goals. (Specifically, our reasons come from both
self-interest and altruism.)
The basis of this argument is an analytic scheme in which we ask
about the purpose of moral norms, or, more generally, norms for de-
cision making. The idea is that the act of endorsing norms is funda-
mental for a certain view of what the relevant question is. There are
surely other questions worth answering, but the question of what
norms we should endorse for decision making is of sufficient interest,
whether or not it exhausts the meaning of "moral" or "rational."
The motivation for norm endorsement can be altruistic, moralis-
tic, or moral. If we want to ask about what norms we should endorse
for others, we are concerned about their behavior. Hence, we want to
put aside the norms that arise from our current moral and moralistic
goals to see whether we can derive these goals from scratch. Again,
this is not the only question to ask, even within this scheme, but it is a
useful question. The answer provides a justification of our goals con-
17 See Baron, Nonn-Endorsement, supra note 5, at 167-70 (explaining the role of
norm endorsement in defining morality).
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cerning others' behavior, without the circularity of justifying those
goals in terms of goals of the same sort.
Our remaining altruistic goals are sufficient to motivate the en-
dorsement of norms for others' decision making. If we successfully
encourage others to rationally pursue their self-interest and to be al-
truistic toward others, they will better achieve their own goals, satisfy-
ing our own altruism toward them. Note that our altruistic goals con-
cern the achievement of their goals, but we have now used this to
justify moral goals, in which we endorse altruistic goals for others.
The upshot of this argument is that we should have moral goals.
That is, we should endorse voluntary altruism and moral behavior.
We should want others to be altruistic, to endorse altruism, and to en-
dorse the endorsement of both of these behaviors. This contrasts with
moralism because it depends completely on the goals that exist in the
absence of any goals for others' voluntary behavior.
I. RATIONAL POLITICAL ACTION
The analysis of goals is relevant to decisions about political action,
such as voting. Most political action is low cost, with little effect on
the decision maker, but it is part of a system in which the little actions
of a great many people taken together have large effects on everyone.
In this regard, it is much like many large-scale public goods problems
(or social dilemmas) in which each person is faced with a choice of
cooperation or defection in the support of a public good, e.g., con-
straining water use when water is short.'
Voting, like cooperation in a social dilemma, is typically not justi-
fiable by the narrow self-interest of the voter.'9 The low cost of voting
and the lack of significant effect on the voter's interests suggest that
voting will typically be motivated by moral beliefs or by expressive
concerns, rather than by rational calculation of self-interest.20 Social
IS This analysis may apply to one side of a political divide, but it cannot apply to
both sides. If one side is the side of defection, its adherents will think that it is actually
cooperation.
'9 See ANrHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 160-63 (1957)
(evaluating the conflict between an individual's self-interest and the interest of a larger
grote, namely her party).
See, e.g., BRENNAN & HAMLIN, supra note 3, at 129-55 (discussing voting and elec-
tions, especially voters' expressive concerns); BRENNAN & LOMASKY, supra note 3, at 90-
96 (comparing expressive and public choice accounts of voting behavior).
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science research generally supports the conclusion that voting is pre-
dicted better from moral beliefs than from narrow self-interest.
2'
Most behavior of interest to legal scholars and economists is pri-
marily self-interested, but most political behavior is not primarily self-
interested in the narrow sense. Voting is unlikely to be rational on the
basis of purely self-interested goals, as I have defined them. Reasons
for individual departures from rationality might include the good feel-
ing of participation, insofar as that feeling is not itself dependent on
altruistic, moral, or moralistic goals. It is hard to imagine such a feel-
ing.
Voting can be rational for you, however, if you are sufficiently al-
22truistic. For similar reasons, voting and other political behavior can
be rational if they achieve moral goals by affecting other people's be-
havior. In principle, such effects could be larger than the effects on
purely altruistic goals. If you are the only altruist in the world, and
your vote made a certain number of people into altruists just like you,
who would then vote altruistically, your influence would be multiplied
by that number of people. Of course, this is unlikely.
Voting may also be rational for someone with sufficiently strong
moralistic goals. Moralistic goals may not be so dependent on the
number of people who behave consistently with them, but they can
also be more powerful than altruistic goals. Most altruistic goals for
other people are weaker than self-interested goals, usually quite a bit
weaker. Moralistic goals are not limited in this way. People who un-
derstand, however vaguely, that voting is not justified by self-interest
may still feel that their moralistic goals require them to vote, and they
are not irrational to feel this way, in terms of their own goals, even
when they are immoral from a utilitarian perspective.
21 See, e.g., David M. Brodsky & Edward Thompson III, Ethos, Public Choice, and Ref-
erendum Voting, 74 SOC. SCI. Q. 286, 297-98 (1993) (finding that voters in a local transit-
funding referendum in Chattanooga, Tennessee, behaved in a selfless, public-
regarding way rather than in a self-interested, private-regarding way); David 0. Sears &
Carolyn L. Funk, The Role of SelfInterest in Social and Political Attitudes, in 24 ADvANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SocIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 76-78 (Mark P. Zanda ed., 1991) (concluding
that empirical evidence shows that voters base their decisions on more than self-
interest); Leonard Shabman & Kurt Stephenson, A Critique of the Self-Interested Voter
Model: The Case of a Local Single Issue Referendum, 28 J. ECON. ISSUES 1173, 1184 (1994)
(reporting that voters in a Roanoke, Virginia, bond referendum were motivated by ex-
pected benefits to the community, as well as by self-interest).
2 SeeJonathan Baron, Political Action Versus Voluntarism in Social Dilemmas and Aid
for the Needy, 9 RATIONALITY & Soc'Y 307, 307 (1997) (concluding that for a "somewhat
selfish and rational utilitarian, under specified assumptions... political action is some-
times worthwhile and superior to voluntarism").
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In sum, voting is rational when it is supported by moral, altruistic,
and moralistic goals. The trouble is that the moralistic goals are often
the strongest. This leads people, through their political behavior, to
impose on others policies that sometimes subvert the other group's
individual goals.
II. WHAT CAN WE Do WHEN MORALISTIC GOALS CAUSE TROUBLE?
I argued for putting aside moralistic goals when thinking about
what norms we would endorse if we did not already have norms. But
real people do not put these goals aside. Although you may not like
other people's moralistic goals, especially when they conflict with your
own goals, they are goals nonetheless. If you are altruistic toward oth-
ers, then you want their goals to be achieved, whatever they are. In
the extreme, moralistic goals are sadistic. Altruism, hence utilitarian-
ism, must count sadistic goals as well."
Sadistic goals, by definition, go against the goals of others, and
moralistic goals often do this as well. Thus, when we are altruistic to-
ward people who have moralistic and sadistic goals, we should also be
altruistic toward those with conflicting goals. Utilitarianism advocates
balancing the two considerations so as to maximize total utility in the
long run. We cannot simply discount sadistic or moralistic goals be-
cause of their nature, but, in any given case, these goals run into resis-
tance from other goals that we must consider.
We do not want people to interfere with our liberties because of
their misguided moral opinions. But we also do not want to interfere
with what might be a well-targeted but unpopular moral opinion. The
problem is exacerbated by the fact that the goals that support political
behavior are weak, and, without moralistic goals, fewer people would
participate at all.
Consider, as an example, whether the Food and Drug Administra-
14tion should approve a rotavirus vaccine. The benefits are the pre-
vention of a serious disease (especially in poor countries, whose ap-
proval of the vaccine may depend on what the FDA does), while the
23 But see HARE, supra note 5, at 140-42 (rejecting the utilitarian idea that "we
should have to give as much weight to the pleasures or preferences of the Marquis de
Sade as to those of Mother Teresa").
24 SeeJon Cohen, Rethinking a Vaccine's Risk, 293 SCIENCE 1576, 1576-77 (2001)
(discussing a pharmaceutical company's decision to voluntarily pull a vaccine off the
market in response to serious side effects, but suggesting that the risk-benefit analysis
would actually weigh in favor of using the vaccine in developing countries where the
virus is more common and more deadly).
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costs include various side effects, some as serious as the disease itself."
But another cost is that citizens are bothered by the idea of putting
some at risk in order to help others. Should this source of opposition
to the vaccine count as part of the cost-benefit analysis?
The opposition to the vaccine may be broken down into two parts.
One is an opinion about what should be done. This is not properly
considered as a component of utility, because it does not involve the
goals of those who hold this opinion. We can, in principle, have opin-
ions about what others should do without actually caring about what
they should do, i.e., without having that as a goal of our own deci-
sions, although of course we usually do care.
The other part is in fact a matter of caring, a goal. It is a moralis-
tic goal because it concerns the behavior of others-such as the FDA,
parents, and pediatricians-and it is held without regard to whether
these others share the goal. A utilitarian cost-benefit analyst would
take this goal into account, because it is part of the utility of those who
hold it.
A. Qualifications: Why We Might Ignore or Suppress Moralistic Goals
This conclusion is qualified by two considerations. One is that
neglecting certain goals might have future benefits in the form of dis-
couraging people from having those goals. When a person's goals in-
terfere with others' pursuit of their goals, we have reason to suppress
26,the former, if we can.
Some goals may even hurt the person who has them. Many goals
are generally desired even when they will not be fully achieved. Most
people, 1 suspect, would rather have a sex drive than not, even if they
know it will not be satisfied. The same can arguably be said for goals
concerning love, friendship, food, drink, the arts, music, and sports.
These are goals to be cultivated. (I put aside the interesting question
of what makes them this way.) Many moralistic goals go in a class that
we might call primarily negative. Once we have these goals, the fail-
ure to satisfy them can make us unhappy, but achieving them is not
usually positive. Due to the lack of positive benefit, in the absence of
such goals, most people would probably not want them. 7 In this re-
25 Id.
26 Cf BARON, MORALn'Y, supra note 5, at 35 (arguing that sadistic goals should be
discouraged); HARE, supra note 5, at 142 (arguing for the adoption of prima facie
principles that discourage sadism and encourage "less harmful pleasure").
27 am assuming this. It is an empirical question, and I'm not sure of the answer.
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gard, the discouragement of moralistic goals might even benefit those
who would otherwise have them. This is also a possible distinction be-
tween self-interested and moralistic goals. Self-interested goals often
interfere with the achievement of others' goals, in the same way that
moralistic goals do. But most self-interested goals are of the positive
type, so there is a greater cost to discouraging their formation and
maintenance.
The other qualifying consideration is that utilitarian analysis
should (arguably) count only fundamental goals, and it should ignore
goals based on false beliefs.28 Some moralistic goals might be based
on false beliefs (such as the belief that the Golden Rule as stated in
The Bible concerns actions but not omissions, if that is indeed false).
To take another example, consider opposition to homosexuality.
Whatever the origin of this in feelings of disgust, the belief that homo-
sexuality is wrong is supported by a host of related beliefs: that it is
unnatural, that it is controllable, and that it has harmful effects on
other aspects of people's lives. Thus, opposition to homosexuality is a
means to the end of avoiding the unnatural through things we can
control. To the extent to which the evidence says homosexuality is
not unnatural, controllable, or harmful, moral opposition is based on
false beliefs. Beliefs, once formed, often resist evidence of their falsity,
but if the evidence had the effect it should, then this belief would be
eliminated or reduced in strength.
One issue here is whether these two qualifications apply when
moralistic goals and self-interested goals coincide. It could turn out
that people's moralistic goals coincide with the self-interested goals of
almost everyone. Surely this happens sometimes. For example, many
people think that human cloning is repulsive and that nobody should
do it. These people provide a number of consequentialist reasons,
but it is clear that these reasons have little to do with the moral view in
question, as they all may disappear in time without reducing their
proponents' opposition to cloning. Why not ban cloning if, for ex-
ample, only one percent of all people would ever think of having
28 See Baron, Norm-Endorsement, supra note 5, at 174 (endorsing "a rule that favors
taking account of fundamental goals, not erroneous subgoals"). More generally, we
should ignore what Keeney calls "means values," that is, goals that are subgoals, or
means to the achievement of other goals. See RAL-i L. KEENEY, VALUE-FOCUSED
THINKING: A PATH TO CREATIVE DECISIONMAKING 34-35 (1992) (defining a "means
objective" as one having interest "because of its implications for the degree to which
another (more fundamental) objective can be achieved"). These goals exist because
they are connected to more fundamental goals by beliefs, which may or may not be
correct.
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themselves cloned? It might even be that ninety percent of people
would favor a ban as a self-control device. They may some day want to
clone themselves, e.g., if they need a bone marrow transplant that a
clone could provide, and they may want the temptation to do so re-
moved by law. Similarly, in the case of a vaccine, it may be that almost
everyone weighs the side effects more than the disease.
In some cases, one or both of these two considerations may make
neglect of moralistic goals desirable. For example, it might be rea-
sonable to put them aside when performing some cost-benefit analy-
ses. When utilities are elicited in surveys, we must take care to sepa-
rate utilities for outcomes from both moralistic goals and opinions
about what others should do. When we ask about vaccines, we should
ask about the consequences without saying which are caused by the
natural disease and which are caused by the vaccine. Similarly, when
we ask about the value of damage to the environment, we should not
say whether the damage was caused by people or by nature itself.2' It
might seem possible to argue that all moralistic goals are based on
false beliefs. The argument would take the form of the argument that
I sketched for utilitarianism itself. Namely, if we did not already have
such moralistic goals, the creation of such goals (itself an act that is
somewhat under our control) could not be motivated by any
nonmoralistic goals that we already have. Therefore, they must arise
from confusion.
In particular, people may initially form moralistic goals on the ba-
sis of their own reaction to some new situation, such as the possibility
of cloning. On the basis of this reaction, they decide that some behav-
ior, such as getting cloned, is not for them. They then go further to
conclude that anyone who thinks otherwise must be misguided and in
need of protection from her own delusions. Thus, out of parentalism
(the gender-neutral version of "paternalism"), people endorse the
general prohibition of the behavior, even in those who benefit from it.
The impulse for moralistic goals is thus the same as the impulse for
altruistic and moral goals, but is based on a false belief about the true
goals of others. This is an especially difficultjudgment to make, how-
ever, because there are surely cases in which such parentalism is justi-
fied, such as when parents try to inculcate in their children a taste for
education or classical music. Difficulty of a judgment, however, does
29 SeeJonathan Baron, Biases in the Quantitative Measurement of Values for Public Deci-
sions, 122 PSYCHOL. BULL. 72, 80 (1997) (finding that measures of values are influ-
enced by irrelevant factors, such as whether the damage was caused by humans or by
nature).
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not imply that there is no such thing as a correct judgment in a given
case. An apparent problem with this argument is that moralistic goals
can be motivated by self-interested goals. One self-interested goal is to
want other people to be like us, to share our religion, for example.
When we live in a community of like-minded others, it is easier for us
to pursue our personal commitments. Thus, moralistic goals may ra-
tionally arise from self-interested goals. Moralistic goals thus become
a kind of rent seeking in the domain of social norms. At least when
we look at moralistic goals in this way, the claim of some people that
moralistic goals should trump other people's goals looks more like a
tough negotiating stance than a high-minded moral assertion. We
must give moralistic goals their due, but simply because they are re-
lated to self-interested goals, not because they have any special status,
despite the claims made for them. Some portion of these goals may
well depend on false beliefs about others.
More to the point, people may come to understand and accept
the kind of argument I have made about the nature of moralistic
goals. To the extent to which they accept such an argument, they
would realize that much of the support for their moralistic goals is
based on a false belief, specifically the belief that moralistic goals are
truly moral, because they are good for those on whom they are im-
posed. People may accept this proposition unreflectively, without
fully putting themselves in the position of those who are affected. The
kind of argument made here may help people identify those cases in
which they are rationalizing, rather than being truly parental toward
others.
III. SOME EXAMPLES OF BIASES
In the rest of this Article, I argue that several biases in judgments
about public policy take the form of moralistic goals to some extent.
These are biases away from utilitarianism, and hence toward worse
overall consequences if the decisions have their intended effects. I
will illustrate these principles from my research on people's judg-
ments about hypothetical policy decisions. When these principles are
moralistic goals, they serve to provide a rational motivation for voting,
because voting serves these goals. One question of my research is to
find out the form of these goals-in particular whether they are mor-
alistic and knowingly nonutilitarian-and another is to explore the
possibility of modifying judgments through de-biasing. I address
three types of principles: allocation principles, protected values, and
parochialism.
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Of primary interest is whether these represent moralistic values, at
least in part. That is, are people willing to impose these principles on
others, even when the others disagree with the principles and prefer
some other option out of self-interest?
A. Allocation
One type of principle concerns allocation of goods or bads.
These principles may thus involve intuitions about fairness. These in-
tuitions generally support policies that lead to worse consequences for
some people, and potentially everyone. 3i Interestingly, people's goals
for distributional properties like fairness are moralistic goals. They go
against the goals of others, with no compensating advantage in achiev-
ing other goals, except for the moralistic goals of others who support
them.
1. Omission Bias
Ilana Ritov and I have examined a set of hypothetical vaccination
decisions modeled after real cases like the rotavirus vaccine,"
(although the actual inspiration was the diphtheria, tetanus, and per-
tussis (DTP) vaccine). 2  In one experiment, subjects were told to
imagine that their child had a 10 out of 10,000 chance of death from a
flu epidemic, a vaccine could prevent the flu, but the vaccine itself
could kill some number of children . Subjects were asked to indicate
the maximum overall death rate for vaccinated children at which they
would still be willing to vaccinate their child, and most subjects an-
swered well below 9 per 10,000.35 Of the subjects who showed this
30 See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 52 (arguing that fairness does not de-
pend exclusively on the well-being of individuals, and therefore "satisfying notions of
fairness can make individuals worse off').
3 lana Ritov &,Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Ambigu-
ity, 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263, 266-77 (1990) (presenting four experiments
where subjects were asked to decide whether to vaccinate a child or require vaccina-
tion by law, given different probabilities that either the vaccine or the disease would
kill the children).
For infonnation regarding DTP vaccination, its risks, and modern alternatives
to the traditional vaccine, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEATI-H & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DIPHTHERIA TETANUS & PERTUSSIS VACCINES:
WHAT You NEED TO KNOw (2001), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nip/publications/
VIS/vis-dtp.pdf.
33 Ritov & Baron, suf/ra note 31, at 267-68.
34 Id. at 268.
25 Id. at 270.
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kind of reluctance, the mean tolerable risk was about 5 out of 10,000,
half the risk of the illness itself.36 These results were also found when
subjects were asked to take the position of a policymaker deciding for• 31
large numbers of children.7 When subjects were asked for justifica-
tions, some said that they would be responsible for any deaths caused
by the vaccine, but they would not be as responsible for deaths caused
38
by failure to vaccinate.
Biases such as this are apparently the basis of philosophical intui-
tions that are often used as counterexamples to utilitarianism, such as
when analyzing the problem of whether one should kill a single per-
son to save five others. Many people feel that they should not kill
even one person and that, therefore, utilitarianism is incorrect.
39
They assume that their intuitions arise from moral truth, usually in
some obscure way. An alternative view, one I have defended else-
where, is that intuitions arise from learning simple rules that usually
coincide with producing good consequences, but, in the critical cases,
do not.4 In terms of consequences, one dead is better than 
five.41
Omission bias is related to issues of public controversy, such as
whether active euthanasia should be allowed, 2 whether vaccines
should be approved or recommended when they have side effects as
bad as (but less frequent than) the diseases they prevent,4 or whether
44
we are morally obligated to help alleviate world poverty.
Omission bias is somewhat labile. It can be reduced by the in-
structions to take the point of view of those who are affected, e.g., "If
you were the child, and if you could understand the situation, you
36 Id.
37 Id. at 266-67.
38 Id. at 275.
39 For an overview of the premise that people prefer harmfil omissions to less
harmful acts, and this premise's relation to consequentialism and utilitarianism, see,
for example, JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING (3d ed. 2000); Jonathan
Baron, Nonconsequentialist Decisions, 17 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (1994).
40 For further discussion of this point, see sources cited supra note 39.
41 Of course, once the intuition starts running, it is bolstered by all sorts of imagi-
nary arguments, some of them about consequences.
2 See, e.g., PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 202-13 (2d ed. 1993) (articulating the
arguments for and against active euthanasia, ultimately concluding that controlled
euthanasia should be permitted).
43 See Cohen, supra note 24, at 1576-77 (describing the current discussion about
reintroducing a vaccine for rotavirus infection-a disease causing diarrhea that kills
nearly 800,000 children per year-that was pulled off the market because of fatal side-
effects in a small number of children).
44 See SINGER, supra note 42, at 229-46 (arguing that individuals have an obligation
to help reduce absolute poverty).
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would certainly prefer the lower probability of death. It would not
matter to you how the probability came about.,
45
2. Proportionality and Zero Risk
People worry more about the proportion of risk reduced than
about the number of people helped. This may be part of a more gen-
eral confusion about quantities. Small children confuse length and
number. As a result, when we ask them to compare rows of objects for
length or number, they will answer in terms of length (or number),
regardless of the question, even if the shorter row has more objects."
The literature on risk effects of pollutants and pharmaceuticals com-
monly reports relative risk, the ratio of the risk with the agent to the
risk without it, rather than the difference. Yet the difference between
the two risks, not their ratio, is most relevant for decision making: if a
baseline risk of injury is one in a million, then twice that risk is still in-
significant; but if the risk is one in three, a doubling of the risk mat-
ters much more.
Several studies have found that people want to give priority to
large proportional reductions of small risks, even though the absolute
• 41
risk reduction is small relative to other options. I have suggested
that these results were the result of quantitative confusion between
relative and absolute risk.48
45 Jonathan Baron, The Effect of Normative Beliefs on Anticipated Emotions, 63 J.
PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 320, 323 (1992).
46 Jonathan Baron et al., Effects of Training and Set Size on Children's Judgments of
Number and Length, 11 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 583, 583-88 (1975) (concluding that
youn children did not differentiate between dimensions of length and number).
See, e.g.,Jonathan Baron, Confusion of Relative and Absolute Risk in Valuation, 14J.
RISK & UNCERTAINIY 301, 307-08 (1997) (finding that subjects were willing to pay for
saving others' lives when the proportion of lives saved was great but not when it was
low, even if the same number of persons were saved); David Fetherstonhaugh et al.,
Insensitivity to the Value of Human Life: A Study of Psychophysical Numbing, 14 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 283, 297-99 (1997) (discussing a series of studies in which subjects were
prone to "psychological numbing," whereby they valued saving a fixed number of per-
sons from a small population more than the same number of persons from a large
population); T.L. McDaniels, Comparing Expressed and Revealed Preferences for Risk Reduc-
tion: Different Hazards and Question Frames, 8 RISK ANALYSIS 593, 593-604 (1988) (analyz-
ing studies that reveal a tendency to spend disproportionate amounts on relative,
rather than absolute, risk reduction); Eric R. Stone et al., Risk Communication: Absolute
Versus Relative Expressions of Low-Probability Risks, 60 ORG'L BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 387, 402-06 (1994) (showing that relative expressions of risk avoidance are
misleading).
48 Baron, supra note 47, at 308.
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The extreme form of this bias is the preference for zero risk. If we
can reduce risks to zero, then we do not have to worry about causing
harm. This intuition is embodied in the infamous Delaney clause, a
provision of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act outlawing any food
additive that increases the risk of cancer by any amount.49 Other laws
favor complete risk reduction, such as the 1980 Superfund law, which
concerns the cleanup of hazardous waste that has been left in the
ground." Justice Stephen Breyer has argued that most agencies are
inclined to spend exorbitant amounts to clean up "the last 10%," im-
plying that, for most purposes, the 90% cleanup is adequate. 1  In
many cases, cleanup costs are so high that the process is proceeding
very slowly:' It is very likely that more waste could be cleaned up
more quickly if laws and regulations did not encourage perfection.
Subjects in questionnaire studies show the same bias toward re-
ducing risk to zero:. They are willing to pay more for a smaller risk
reduction if the reduction causes the risk to become zero.5 ' They also
prefer a smaller reduction over a larger one if the former reduces
55some risk to zero.
4) Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, § 4, 72 Star. 1784, 1786
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (2000)) ("[N]o additive shall be
deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or ani-
m al .... ).
50 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and. Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9607 (2000)).
51 See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOwARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 10-19 (1993) (arguing that, due to administrative and regulatory "tunnel
vision," the majority of costs for regulating health risks goes to the final 10% of the
project's targeted problem).
52 See id. at 18-19 (citing various estimates for the cost of toxic waste cleanup, in-
cluding one possibility reaching as high as one trillion *dollars); cf id. at 11-12 (describ-
ing a particular instance of litigation and cleanup efforts continuing despite no evi-
dence to suggest that the site posed additional risk).
53 See, e.g.,Jonathan Baron et al., Attitudes Toward Managing Hazardous Waste: What
Should Be Cleaned up and Who Should Pay for It?, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 183, 190-91 (1993)
(discussing subjects' bias toward zero risk); W. Kip Viscusi et al., An Investigation of the
Rationality of Consumer Valuations of Multiple Health Risks, 18 RAND]. ECON. 465, 468-69
(1987) (describing the concept of a "certainty premium").
54 See Viscusi et al., supra note 53, at 478 (finding that subjects were willing to pay
extremely large premiums to eliminate risk).
55 See Baron et al., supra note 53, at 190 (indicating that subjects preferred a total
cleanup of one waste site that saved fewer lives than a partial cleanup of two waste
sites).
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3. Ex Ante Equity
The ex ante bias is the finding that people want to equate ex ante
risk within a population even when the ex post risk is greater. For ex-
ample, many people would give a screening test to everyone in a
group of patients covered by the same HMO if the test would prevent
1000 cancer cases rather than give a test to half of the patients (picked
at random) that would prevent 1100 cancer cases . Peter Ubel, David
Asch, and I found that this bias was reduced when the group was ex-
panded. 7 When subjects were told that the HMO actually covered
people living in two states and that the test could not be given in one
of the states, some subjects switched their preference to the test that
581prevented more cancers. It was as though they reasoned that, since
the "group" was now larger, they could not give the test to "everyone"
anyway and might as well aim for better consequences, given that
"fairness" could not be achieved.5  This result illustrates a potential
problem with some nonutilitarian concepts of distributive justice,
namely that the distributions they entail can change as the group
definition is changed. If groups are arbitrary, then the idea of fair dis-
tribution is also arbitrary.
4. Are Allocation Biases Moralistic?
Recently I have been exploring the role of these allocation biases
in low-cost political behavior, such as answering questions in polls.
The experiments present subjects with hypothetical decisions, and the
subjects say how they think the decisions should be made. One series
of studies asks whether people are willing to impose their allocation
judgments on others, even when the others disagree. That is, do these
biases form the basis of moralistic goals? I shall summarize one such
study.60
In this study, ninety-one subjects completed an online question-
naire designed to test three types of biases: omission bias, zero bias,
56 Peter A. Ubel et al., Cost Effectiveness Analysis in a Setting of Budget Constraints: Is It
Equitable?, 334 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1174, 1175-76 (1996).
57 See Peter A. Ubel et al., Preference for Equity as a Framing Effect, 21 MED. DECISION
MAKING 180, 180-86 (2001) (finding that preference for equitable testing was subject
to framing effects).
58 Id. at 184-85.
59 Id. at 187.
60 The general approach applies to all the studies described in this Article and is
reported in an unpublished manuscript currently on file with the author.
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and ex ante bias. Subjects found the questionnaire page through
links in other web pages and through search engines." Their ages
ranged from 18 to 74 (with a median of 38), 29% were male, 14%
were students. The questionnaire provided a general description of
the scenario, which concerned a health insurance company that had
to decide which expensive treatments to cover. Each screen pre-
sented a choice of two treatments, A and B. An example of a screen
testing the omission bias was:
Treatment A cures 50% of the 100 patients per week who have this
condition, and it causes no other conditions.
Treatment B cures 80% of the 100 patients per week who have this
condition, but it causes a different (equally serious) condition in 20% of
them.
The test questions were:
Which treatment leads to fewer sick people? Which treatment
should the company choose (if it didn't know what its members favored)?
Now suppose that 75% of the members favor Treatment B. They
think B leads to fewer sick people and that is what they care about.
Which treatment should the company choose?
Now suppose that 100% of the members favor Treatment B ....
Now suppose that 75% of the members favor Treatment A ....
Now suppose that 100% of the members favor Treatment A ....
Each question was followed by a four-point response scale: "Certainly
A," "Probably A," "Probably B," and "Certainly B." The subject had to
answer the test question correctly in order for the answers to be re-
corded. The text of the conditions testing the zero and ex ante biases
read:
Zero Bias:
Treatment A is for a type of the condition that affects 50 patients per
week. It cures 100% of them.
Treatment B is for a type of the condition that affects 100 patients
per week. It cures 60% of them.
Ex ante Bias:
Treatment A can be given to all 100 patients per week who have this
condition, and it cures 30% of them.
61 See Jonathan Baron, Questionnaire Studies, at http://www.psych.upenn.edu/
-baron/qs.html (last modified Mar. 21, 2003) (providing updates about, and links to,
my ongoing research).
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Treatment B is in short supply. It can be given only to 50 of the 100
patients per week with this condition, picked at random. It cures 80% of
these 50.
The experiment included a control condition with the same wording
as the ex ante condition, but with no difference in the number of pa-
tients who could get the treatment.
The main result was that bias was present even when 100% of the
members wanted the optimal treatment covered. For example, in the
omission bias condition, the mean bias was 0.19 (on a scale where 0
represents neutrality between the two treatments and 1.5 is the maxi-
mum omission bias possible), in contrast to a mean bias of 0.16 for the
control condition when subjects think the more effective treatment
leads to fewer sick people and that is what they care about. In sum,
some people are willing to impose their allocation judgments on oth-
ers, even when it is clear that the consequences for others are worse
and that the others do not favor the allocations in question.
5. De-Biasing Allocation Biases
Another series of studies has explored de-biasing. In one study,
Andrea Gurmankin and I explored two general methods of de-
biasing. The "minimal" method involved stripping away information
and focusing on consequences alone, a minimal description. We tried
this method on four different biases: omission bias, zero-harm bias,
preference for ex ante equality, and preference for group equality
(even when these made consequences worse). Here is an example of
the testing condition for the omission bias:
Treatment A cures 50 people out of 100 who come in with condition
Xeach week, and it leads to no other conditions.
Treatment B cures 80 of the people with condition X, but it leads to
condition Y, occurring randomly in 20 of the 100 patients. X and Y are
equally serious.
The following was added for the experimental condition: mini-
mal de-biasing. In other words, treatment A leads to 50 people with
condition X and nobody with any other condition, and treatment B
leads to 20 people with condition X and 20 people with condition Y,
which is equally serious. In general, this minimal de-biasing manipu-
lation reduced bias on several different measures. The effects were
small but statistically significant. Most subjects thought that the sum-
mary ("In other words .. ") was fair.
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A second method, like that just described, involved expansion by
providing additional information that might change the bias. A typi-
cal item, for the zero-risk bias, was:
Zero-Risk Bias:
X and Y are two kinds of cancer, equally serious. Each year, 100
people get cancer Xand 50 get cancer Y.
Treatment A is given to the 100 people with cancer X. It cures 60 of
them.
Treatment B can be given to the 50 people with cancer Y. It cures all
50 of them.
The following was added in the de-biasing condition:
The total number of cancer cases of all types, including X and Y, is
1000 each year. Treatment A thus cures 60 out of 1000 cases, and treat-
ment B cures 50 out of 1000.
Subjects were asked which option should be covered by an HMO if it
had to choose one. In one study, the expansion statement led sub-
jects to favor the optimal treatment, A, and most subjects did not
think that it was inconsistent with the initial statement.
These results have two implications. First, as a practical matter,
biases can be reduced by restating the issue. Second, as a theoretical
matter, biases are subject to framing effects-subject to change with
redescription of the same situation-and should thus not be taken as
people's last, most-considered view on the issues.
B. Protected Values
People think that some of their values are protected from trade-
offs with other values. Many of these values concern natural re-
sources such as species and pristine ecosystems. People with pro-
tected values (PVs) for these things do not think they should be sacri-
ficed for any compensating benefit, no matter how small the sacrifice
or how large the benefit. In an economic sense, when values are pro-
tected, the marginal rate at which one good can be substituted for an-
other is infinite. For example, no amount of money can substitute for
certain types of environmental decline.
62 SeeJonathan Baron & Mark Spranca, Protected Values, 70 ORG'L BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 1, 1-16 (1997) ("Protected values are those that resist trade-offs
with other values, particularly economic values."); Philip E. Tetlock et al., Revising the
Value Pluralism Model. Incorporating Social Content and Context Postulates, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF VALUES: THE ONIARIO SYMPOSIUM 25, 36-39 (Clive Seligman et al.
eds., 1996) (explaining that "sacred" values resist trade-offs).
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PVs concern rules about action, irrespective of their conse-
quences, rather than consequences themselves. What counts as a type
of action, e.g., lying, may be defined partly in terms of its consequence
(false belief) or intended consequence, but the badness of the action
is notjust that of its consequence, so the action has value of its own.
Omission bias is greater when PVs are involved . For example,
when people have a PV for biological species generally, they are even
less willing to cause the destruction of one species in order to save
even more species from extinction. Thus, PVs primarily apply to acts,
as opposed to omissions. 4
People think that their PVs should be honored even when their
violation has no consequence at all. People who have PVs for forests,
for example, say that they should not buy stock in a company that de-
stroys forests, even if their purchase would not affect the share price
and would not affect anyone else's behavior with respect to the forests.
This is an "agent relative" obligation, a rule for the person holding the
value that applies to her own choices but not (as much) to her obliga-
tions with respect to others' choices. So it is better for her not to buy
the stock, even if her not buying it means that someone else will.
PVs are at least somewhat insensitive to quantity. People who hold
a PV for forests tend to say that it isjust as bad to destroy a large forest
as a small one .5 They say this more often than they say the same thing
for violations of nonprotected values (NPVs) .
Several researchers have noted that PVs cause problems for quan-
titative elicitation of values, as is done in cost-benefit analysis or deci-
sion analysis.6 ' PVs imply infinite values.
See generally Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Protected Values and Omission Bias, 79
ORG'L BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 79, 93-94 (1999) (concluding that ex-
perimental subjects with protected values had a large bias against harmful acts that go
against the value as opposed to harmful omissions).
64 See id. at 80 ("PVs... show stronger omission bias than other values. Omission
bias is the tendency to be less concerned with harms caused by omission than with
identical harms caused by action.").
fi, Id. at 86-88.
66 Cf id. at 86 ("Although omission bias was greater for PVs, it remained for
[NPVs].").
67 See Baron, supra note 29, at 72-88 (noting that some PVs cause distinct cost-
benefit problems because there is no way for the market to price some preferences);
Max H. Bazerman et al., The Human Mind as a Barrier to Wiser Environmental Agreements,
42 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1277, 1286-88 (1999) (observing that when dealing with cer-
tain sacred or protected values, it becomes difficult to determine the actual value of a
belief or at what price it is tradeable).
115720031
1158 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 151:1135
Notice that the issue here is not behavior. Surely, people who en-
dorse PVs violate them in their behavior, but these violations do not
imply that the values are irrelevant for social policy. People may want
public decisions to be based on the values they hold on reflection, re-
gardless of their actual behavior. When people learn that they have
violated some value they hold, they may regret their action rather
than revising the value.
1. PVs Are Moralistic Too
It should not be surprising that people think of PVs as rules that
are independent of consequences for people. I did an experiment to
demonstrate this, using examples such as: testing a fetus for "IQ
genes," and aborting it if its expected IQ is below average; cloning
someone with desired traits, such as an athletic champion or a bril-
liant scientist, so that these may be passed on; modifying the genes of
an embryo so that, when born, it will have a higher IQ; and giving a
drug (with no side effects) to enhance school performance of normal
children. On each screen, the item was presented, followed by a series
of questions with possible answers printed on buttons (shown here as
rectangles). The significant questions, absent the mnemonic names
in brackets, were:
Should the government allow this to be done? ["Allow"]
This should be allowed, so long as other laws are followed.
This should sometimes be allowed, with safeguards against abuse.
This should never be allowed, no matter how great the need.
If the circumstances were (or are) present so that the consequences
of allowing this were better than the consequences of banning it, should
it be allowed? ["If-Better"]
I I cannot imagine this.
If these circumstances were present, and if almost everyone in a na-
tion thought that the behavior should be allowed, should it be allowed in
that nation under these circumstances? ["If-Pro"]
Yes, allowed. Nobanned. Icannotimaginethis.
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The mean proportions of endorsement are shown in the following ta-
bles:
Allow Sometimes Never
"Allow" 0.40 0.32 0.28
Allow Ban Can't Imagine
"If-Better" 0.71 0.20 0.09
Allow Ban Can't Imagine
"If-Pro" 0.72 0.22 0.06
Of interest, subjects favored bans 22% of the time, even though, in
these cases, they could imagine that the action was better and that the
vast majority favored it. In other words, subjects were willing to im-
pose their values on others.
2. Parentalism
A question that arises here is whether protected values, in their
moralistic form, are parentalistic. That is, whether people who im-
pose their values on others think that they are really going against the
values of others. Surely this must happen because of belief overkill.
People do not like their beliefs to conflict, so they deceive themselves
into agreement. They are thus likely to think that their values are
really good for everyone, whether others know it or not. However,
this distortion of beliefs may be incomplete; we might expect some
cases in which -people know that their moralistic values go against the
interests of others.
To test this possibility, I did another experiment, in which I at-
tempted to find actions that were done by a specific person and that
benefited that person. For example:
A mother gives a drug (with no side effects) to her child that will
improve the child's school performance (which is otherwise average).
["IQ Drug"]
A single, childless woman has a child by cloning herself because she
has no prospect for marriage. ["Clone"]
A young widow has a child by cloning her husband, using cells taken
from him as he was dying. ["Widow"]
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A man in his fifties has himself cloned to produce an embryo that
will yield cells that will prevent him from getting Alzheimer's disease.
["Alzheimer's"]
PVs were defined roughly as in the last study I described. The main
question of interest was:
(8) If the person were stopped from doing this, how would it affect
[him/her], on the whole (considering all effects together)?
Stopping it would be good for [him/her] on the whole, and [he/she] would
see it as good, immediately.
Stopping it would be good for [him/her] on the whole, and [he/she] would
see it as good, eventually.
Stopping it would be good for [him/her] on the whole, even if [he/she]
thought it was bad.
Stopping it would be good for [him/her] on the whole, because it would go
against what [he/she] wants.
Stopping it would be good for [him/her] on the whole, because it would in-
fringe on [his/her] rights.
The following table shows the main results as proportions for the four
cases shown above. (Other results were similar.)
PV Stop-Effect Stop/PV
"IQ drug" 0.404 0.509 0.196
"Clone" 0.588 0.421 0.104
"Widow" 0.500 0.509 0.158
"Alzheimer's" 0.404 0.605 0.152
In the table, stop-effect is the proportion of answers in which stopping
the act was acknowledged to be bad for the actor-the last two options
of question (8)-and Stop/PV is the proportion of PV responses in
which stopping the act was acknowledged to be bad. Although
Stop/PV is much lower than Stop-effect, as predicted by the belief-
overkill hypothesis,"" it is not zero. In a substantial number of cases
68 For an evaluation of this hypothesis, in which "unreflective overgeneralizations
provide one possible avenue for challenging PVs to make compromises and trade-offs
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the subjects did acknowledge that their imposed values were harmful
to the actors.
3. Challenging PVs
PVs may be unreflective overgeneralizations. People may endorse
the statement that, "No benefit is worth the sacrifice of a pristine rain-
forest," without thinking much about possible benefits, e.g., a cure for
cancer or malaria. Or, when people say that they would never trade
off life for money, they may fail to think of extreme cases, such as
crossing the street (hence risking loss of life from being hit by a car)
to pick up a large check, or failing to increase the healthcare budget
enough to vaccinate every child or screen everyone for colon cancer.
Such unreflective overgeneralizations provide one possible avenue for
challenging PVs in order to make compromise and trade-offs possible.
If PVs are unreflective in this way, then PVs should yield to simple
challenges. In an experiment conducted in 2000, Sarah Leshner and
I gave subjects questions about whether they would regard certain
outcomes, such as, "Electing a politician who has made racist com-
ments," as against their values to such an extent that no benefit would
be sufficient to justify actions that caused such outcomes. 0  Then,
when values were protected in this way, we challenged the subjects by
asking them to think of counterexamples. We found that PVs do
sometimes respond to such challenges.70
We also found that the effects of counterexamples can transfer to
measures of omission bias, the bias toward harm caused by omissions
when that is pitted against harm caused by acts." The last two ex-
periments found that PVs are not honored when the probability and
magnitude of harm is low enough.
In a more recent experiment, I have found that PVs have less of
an effect on decisions when subjects are asked to put themselves in
the position of a government decision maker with sole responsibility
for the decision, as opposed to putting themselves in the position of a
citizen responding to an opinion survey.12 The latter position is close
to what the subjects are actually doing, so it is not hard to imagine.
possible," see Jonathan Baron & Sarah Leshner, How Serious Are Expressions of Protected
Values, 6J. EXP'L PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 183, 184 (2000).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 185.
71 Id. at 185, 187-88.
72 Baron, supra note 60.
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The former may be more difficult, but subjects were significantly more
willing to make trade-offs when they were asked to imagine themselves
making the actual decisions." This result provides further evidence
for the lability of PVs.
The results of the experiments described above suggest that PVs
are strong, moralistic opinions that are weakly held. They are strong
in the sense that they express infinite trade-offs-holders of these val-
ues assert that they are so important that they should not be traded off
for anything. This assertion yields to a variety of challenges. After
yielding, of course, the value may still be strong in the sense that a
large amount of benefit is required to sacrifice the value.
C. Parochialism
The tendency of people to favor a group that includes themselves,
at the expense of outsiders and even at the expense of their own self-
interest, has been called parochialism. We may think of parochial-
ism as an expression of both altruistic and moralistic goals. It is altru-
istic toward comembers. It may be moralistic in its effects on outsid-
ers. The outsiders are being asked to help achieve the goals of
insiders, in effect, whether this is consistent with their own goals or
not. (What is not clear is whether they are being asked to do this vol-
untarily, or whether coerced behavior would suffice, in which case the
values are not truly moralistic.) More likely, though, parochialism is
moralistic in its application to insiders, who are expected to be loyal to
the group.
A prime example is nationalism, a value that goes almost unques-
tioned in many circles,just as racism and sexism went unquestioned in
the past. Nationalists are concerned with their fellow citizens, regard-
less of the effect on outsiders. Nationalists are willing to harm outsid-
ers, such as in war, for the benefit of conationals. This sort of nation-
alism is moralistic to the extent to which nationalists want outsiders to
behave willingly in ways that benefit their conationals, e.g., cede terri-
tory, stop trying to immigrate, or allow foreign investment. National-
ists typically want others in the group to be nationalists as well. The
idea that one should vote for the good of humanity as a whole, regard-
less of the effect on one's own nation, would make total sense to a
73 Id.
74 See Peregrine Schwartz-Shea & Randy T. Simmons, Egoism, Parochialism, and Uni-
versalism, 3 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 106, 107 (1991) (defining parochialism as "the norm
that one owes cooperation to one's 'solidarity group"').
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utilitarian (and it would require little self-sacrifice because voting has
such a tiny effect on self-interest); however, such a vote would be con-
sidered immoral by the nationalist.
An experiment by Bornstein and Ben-Yossef illustrates the paro-
chialism effect. Subjects came in groups of 6 and were assigned at
75random to a red group and a green group, with 3 in each group.
Each subject started with 5 Israeli Shekels (IS), about $2.76 If the sub-
ject contributed this endowment, each member of the subject's group,
including the subject, would get 3 IS. This amounts to a net loss of 2
IS for the subject, but a total gain of 4 IS for the group. However, the
contribution would also cause each member of the other group to lose 3
IS. Thus, taking both groups into account, the gains for one group
matched the losses to the other, except that the contributor lost the
original 5 IS. The effect of this 5 IS loss was simply to move goods
from the other group to the subject's group. Still the average rate of
contribution was 55%, and this was substantially higher than the rate
of contribution in control conditions in which the contribution did
not affect the other group (27%). Of course, the control condition
was a real social dilemma in which the net benefit of the contribution
was truly positive.
Similar results have been found by Peregrine Schwartz-Shea and
Randy Simmons.77 Notice that the parochialism effect is found despite
the fact that an overall analysis of costs and benefits would point
strongly toward the opposite result. Specifically, cooperation is truly
beneficial, overall, in the one-group condition, and truly harmful in
the two-group condition, because the contribution is lost and there is
no net gain for others.
This kind of experiment might be a model for cases of real-world
conflict in which people sacrifice their own self-interest to help their
group at the expense of some other group. We see this in strikes and
in international, ethnic, and religious conflict, when people even put
their lives on the line for the sake of their group and at the expense of
another group. We also see it in attempts to influence government
75 Gary Bornstein & Meyrav Ben-Yossef, Cooperation in Intergroup and Single-Group
SocialDilemmas, 30J. EXP'L SOC. PSYCHOL. 52, 58-59 (1994).
76 Id. at 56.
77 See Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, supra note 74, at 124-25 (finding that discussion
increased parochial behavior and that outgroup identity affected the extent of such
behavior); Peregrine Schwartz-Shea & Randy T. Simmons, 7he Layered Prisoners' Di-
lemma: Ingroup Versus Macro-Efficiency, 65 PUB. CHOICE 61, 69-80 (1990) (testing the
effects of discussion, outgroup identity, and decision-making structure on ingroup co-
operation).
20031 1163
1164 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REWVEW [Vol. 151:1135
policy in favor of one's own group and at the expense of other groups,
through voting and contributions of time and money. We can look at
such behavior from three points of view: the individual, the group,
and everyone (the world). Political action in favor of one's group is
beneficial for the group but, in these cases, costly to both the individ-
ual and the world.
In part, parochialism seems to result from two illusions. In one,
people confuse correlation and cause, thinking that they influence
others becausethey think, "I amjust like others, so if I contribute, they
will too." '78 In the second illusion, people think that self-sacrifice for
their own group is in their self-interest because their contribution
"comes back." They do not work through the arithmetic, which would
show that what comes back is less than what goes in.78 People who sac-
rifice on behalf of others like themselves may be more prone to the
self-interest illusion because they see the benefits as going to people
who are like themselves in some salient way. They think, roughly, "My
cooperation helps people who are X. I am X. Therefore it helps me."
This kind of reasoning is easier to engage in when X represents a par-
ticular group than when it represents people in general. Thus, this
illusion encourages parochialism.8"
1. Parochialism Is Moralistic
If parochialism is a moralistic value for co-citizens, then people
are willing to impose it on others, even when they disagree and even
when it goes against the greater good. This tendency might be
greater when nationalism can be justified by perceived unfairness. In
an experiment to test whether parochialism is moralistic, I manipu-
lated unfairness by telling subjects that "your nation," i.e., the subject's
nation, had already made a substantial contribution to some public
78 See George A. Quattrone & Amos Tversky, Causal Versus Diagnostic Contingencies:
On Self-Deception and on the Voter's Illusion, 46J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 237, 244
(1984) (hypothesizing that people will make choices to "induce" other like-minded
people to do the same).
SeeJonathan Baron, The Illusion of Morality as Self-Interest: A Reason to Cooperate in
Social Dilemmas, 8 PSYCHOL. Sci. 330, 334 (1997) ("People may fail to attempt a quanti-
tative comparison between the costs of cooperation and the benefits to the self that
result from the effect of cooperation .... The latter benefits exist, but they are typi-
cally... small compared with the costs.").
See BAZERMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 104-06 (explaining that this type of reason-
ing is the cause behind much special-interest group action).
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good."' Even though it would be best for all if the nation continued to
contribute, people might feel that it was another nation's turn. The
experiment involved two kinds of situations (with four examples of
each): one like a prisoners' dilemma in which each of two nations de-
cided independently on its action, and one in which an external
authority could impose a solution. A typical screen began:
This case involves a dispute about contributions to a peacekeeping
force, which needs reinforcements. It is best for each nation to maintain
its current contribution, whatever the other nation does. But casualties
will rise from 1% to 5% per year without reinforcements.
In the unfairness condition, the following was added:
Your nation has already contributed an additional 50% and has
committed somewhat more troops and equipment than the other nation.
(Further contributions are based on your nation's current level.)
The experiment continued:
Consider the following three proposals for a choice to be made by
your government. [In the unfairness condition, the decision would be
made by an international agency.]
A: Your nation contributes 40% more. The casualty rate will remain
at 1%, even if the other nation does nothing.
B: Your nation contributes 20% more. The casualty rate will rise to
3% if the other does nothing, and it will stay at 1% if the other nation
also contributes 20%.
C: Your nation does nothing. The casualty rate will rise to 5% if the
other nation does nothing, 3% if it contributes 20% more, and 1% if it
contributes 50% more.
When the decision was made by the international agency, the three
options all maintained the best outcome but varied the contributions.
For example:
Your nation contributes 40% more. The casualty rate will stay at 1%.
Both nations contribute 20% more. The casualty rate will stay at %.
The other nation contributes 50% more. The casualty rate will stay
at I%.
Five questions followed. The two of greatest interest, (4) and (5), are
shown here, with alternatives in brackets. (The term "approved" will
be explained shortly.)
These experimental results are reported in the unpublished manuscript cited
supra note 60.
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(4) What should your government [alternatively, "the international
agency"] choose if almost everyone voted for (approved) B in an advisory
referendum and almost nobody voted for (approved) A or C? [Options
were A- C.]
(5) What should your government [alternatively, "the international
agency"] choose if almost everyone voted for (approved) A in an advisory
referendum and almost nobody voted for (approved) B or C? [Options
were A-C.]
Option A was always worst for the subject's nation, but it required less
sacrifice than option C would require for the other nation.
Even when a majority favored one of the proposals other than the
one that favored the group, i.e., Self, subjects still favored the Self
proposal: 4% in the fair condition when the decision was national,
6% when made by an external authority, 9% when unfair and na-
tional, and 12% when unfair and external. The effects of the type of
decision and fairness were both significant. These results support the
view that parochial values are sometimes moralistic.
2. De-Biasing Parochialism with Approval Voting
The experiment also contrasted two types of voting. In approval
voting, voters say yes or no to each of several candidates or proposals.
The option with the most approvals wins. By contrast, in standard
plurality voting, voters vote for one option, and the option with the
most votes wins. Approval voting has many well-known advantages
over plurality voting.
Approval voting could reduce parochialism if people could see
themselves as members not only of their own group, but also of the
larger group that includes affected outsiders; they would then approve
proposals consistent with both views. Such voters may be torn be-
tween the greater good for all and the demands of the self-interest il-
813
lusion for their narrow group. In the present experiment, like oth-
ers I have done, approval voting generally yielded more votes for the
most efficient proposal (counting approval votes).
An important question is whether the use of approval voting itself
reduces moralistic, i.e., Self, responses about how government should
respond to the votes of others. The experiment provided some evi-
82 See STEVENJ. BRAMS & PETER C. FISHBURN, APPROVAL VOTING 3-11 (1983) (de-
scribing the advantages that approval voting has over plurality voting and considering
possible objections).
8.3 See Baron, supra note 79, at 330-34 (reporting experimental results that examine
the self-interest illusion).
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dence for this. At least in subjects who showed an effect of approval
voting in other questions, the number of Self responses to the two
questions of interest was lower with approval voting than without it.
In sum, approval voting reduced the expression of parochial moralis-
tic values themselves. It may be that nationalists are more tolerant of
others who vote for the greater good when the voting is by approval
voting.
CONCLUSION
The main argument of this Article is that biases away from utili-
tarianism may take the form of moralistic values, in which people seek
to impose their values on the behavior of others, sometimes explicitly
ignoring the nature of others' good (utility). I have presented ex-
periments showing this for allocation biases and protected values and
for parochialism. Moralistic values are often supported by beliefs that
make them appear to be altruistic or moral. The beliefs are necessar-
ily incorrect and are thus amenable to correction in varying degrees. I
have discussed some experiments showing that nonconsequentialist
biases can be reduced.
In the long run, we might be able to de-bias moralistic values as
well. Many of these values might arise partly as errors based on false
beliefs about the good of others. A group may think that others are
more like them than they are; their good may actually differ. If peo-
ple could come to see moralistic values as possible errors, they would
be more open to discussion about those values, and more open to evi-
dence about the true nature of other people's good.
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